In anonymous secret sharing schemes, the secret can be reconstructed without knowledge of which participants hold which shares.
Introduction
A (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme [1, 6] is a method in which a dealer distributes a secret s to a set of n users in such a way that any k or more users can recover the secret s and any k − 1 or less users have no information on s. On the other hand, in an anonymous secret sharing scheme, the secret can be reconstructed without knowledge of which participants hold which shares. In such schemes, the computation of the secret can be carried out by giving the shares to a black box that does not know the identities of the participants holding those shares. This would seem to be a desirable property in certain applications. For example, if the scheme is to be used to provide access to a secure area, then an anonymous scheme will provide security without the need for a separate identification protocol.
Anonymous secret sharing schemes were first investigated by Stinson and Vanstone [7] . In the model proposed in [7] , the participants receive distinct shares (we will call such a scheme a "strict" anonymous scheme). The authors proved a lower bound on the size of the shares and provided optimal schemes for certain class of threshold structures by using a combinatorial characterization of optimal schemes.
Next Phillips and Phillips [5] considered a different model for anonymous secret sharing schemes. In their model, different participants are allowed to receive the same shares. They analyzed ideal anonymous secret sharing schemes in which the size of the shares given to each participant is equal to the size of the secret. The authors proved that an ideal anonymous (k, n)-threshold scheme can be realized if and only if k = 1 or k = n.
Recently, Blundo and Stinson [2] showed a lower bound on the size of the shares for (k, n)-threshold schemes with 1 < k < n together with another lower bound for an infinite class of access structures. They also presented constructions, some of which use Steiner systems.
In this paper, we derive a tighter lower bound on the size of the shares than the bound of Blundo and Stinson for anonymous (k, n)-threshold scheme with 1 < k < n. Our bound is tight for k = 2. We also show a close relationship between optimum anonymous (2, n)-threshold secret schemes and resolvable Steiner systems.
Preliminaries

Notation and definitions
Let P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } be a set of n participants and D be a dealer. Let S be a set of secrets and V be a set of shares. Suppose that the dealer D wants to share the secret s ∈ S among the participants in P.
We represent a secret sharing scheme by a collection of distribution rules.
A distribution rule is a function
A distribution rule f represents a possible distribution of shares to participants, where f (D) is the secret being shared, and f (P i ) is the share given to P i . If s ∈ S is the secret that D wants to share, then D will choose a distribution rule f such that
uniformly at random, and use f to distribute shares to participants. Let {Pr(s)} s∈S be a probability distribution on S. Let F be a family of distribution rules. We define (k, n)-threshold secret sharing schemes as follows.
Definition 2.1 A (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is a collection of distribution rules F that satisfy the following two properties: 
If B ⊆ P and |B|
Finally, we will use braces { } to denote sets and square brackets [ ] to denote multisets (a multiset is a set containing repeated elements).
Known results
Phillips and Phillips showed the following proposition [5] . [3, 4] . Blundo and Stinson showed a lower bound on |V | for 1 < k < n such as follows [2] .
Proposition 2.1 There exists an anonymous (k, n)-threshold scheme such that |V | = |S| if and only if
k = 1 or k = n. Therefore, |V | > |S| if 1 < k < n from
Proposition 2.2 In any anonymous
(k, n)-threshold schemes with 1 < k < n, |V | > (n − k + 2) |S| − 1 |S| − 1 (|S| − 1).
Tighter Lower Bound on |V |
In this section, we derive a tighter lower bound on |V | than Proposition 2.2 for anonymous (k, n)-threshold schemes. Let
where B f is a multiset. We call B f a block. Fix a distribution rule f 0 ∈ F arbitrarily and define
Then Blundo and Stinson showed the following proposition. 
Our lower bound
Now we present our lower bound. Let
Theorem 3.1 In any anonymous (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme
arbitrarily. Then there are two cases. 
Then we have
Note that each y ∈ Y j appears in M j at most c y times, where c y ≤ c. Count the elements (other than x 0 ) of M j in two ways. Then
Hence
Next for any
(Case 2) [x 0 , x 0 ] occurs in no blocks. Then similarly to (case 1), we have
for any j ∈ S. Therefore,
2 It is easy to see that this bound is tighter than Proposition 2.2.
Generalization
A qualified subset of P which can recover the secret is called an access set, and the family of all access sets is called the access structure, denoted by Γ.
Definition 3.1 [5, 2] An anonymous secret sharing scheme for Γ is a collection of distribution rules which satisfy the following two properties:
If B ∈ Γ, then for all
and for all secrets s ∈ S, it holds Pr(s | b) = Pr(s).
Blundo and Stinson showed the following lower bound on |V | by generalizing the proof of Proposition 2.2. Let Γ 0 = {{P 1 , P 3 , P 4 }, {P 2 , P 4 }, {P 1 , P 2 }} be the minimal qualified set of an access structure on the set of participants P = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 }. In this case, we can take B = {P 3 }.
Definition 3.2 We say that B ⊆ P is a semi-maximal nonaccess set if
B ∪{P i } ∈ Γ for all P i ∈ P \B and B ∪{P i , P j } ∈ Γ for all {P i , P j } ⊆ P \B.
Corollary 3.1 [2] In any anonymous secret sharing scheme for
On the other hand, by generalizing the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can obtain the following lower bounds.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that there exists a semi-maximal nonaccess set B ⊆ P in an anonymous secret sharing scheme for Γ. Then
|V | ≥ (n − |B| − 1)(|S| − 1) + 1.
Corollary 3.2 In any anonymous secret sharing scheme for
It is clear that our bounds are tighter than Proposition 3.2 and Corollary 3.1.
Relationship with Combinatorial Designs
Steiner systems
We now present some basic terminology from design theory. A k-(v, n, λ) design is a pair (V, B) , where V is a set of v elements and B is a family of subsets of V of size n (called blocks), such that every subset of elements of size k appears in exactly λ blocks. A k-(v, n, λ) design is said to be nontrivial if k < n < v. A Steiner system is a k-(v, n, 1) design, also denoted by S(k, n, v). Let (V, B) be a Steiner system. We say that (V, B) is partitionable if we can partition the set of blocks B into sets B 1 , . . ., B in such a way that each (V, B j ), for 1 ≤ j ≤ , is a Steiner system S(k − 1, n, v). If a Steiner system is partitionable, then the integer = (v − k + 1)/(n − k + 1). A partitionable S (2, n, v) is called resolvable. For general information on the existence of k-(v, n, λ) designs, we refer to [8] Blundo and Stinson showed the following Proposition [2] . 
Relationship between optimum schemes and Steiner systems
We say that an anonymous (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is optimum if the equality of Theorem 3.1 is satisfied. Then we obtain the following theorem immediately from Proposition 4.1.
Theorem 4.1 There exists an optimum anonymous (2, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme if there exists a resolvable Steiner system S(2, n, |V |).
This Theorem implies that Theorem 3.1 is tight for k = 2. We next prove a weak converse of Theorem 4.1. That is, we prove that there exists a Steiner system S(2, n, |V |) (not necessarily resolvable) if there exists an optimum anonymous (2, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
In what follows, suppose that there exists an optimum anonymous (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme. Then the following lemmas hold from the proof of Theorem 3.1. (We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 3.1.) Lemma 4.1 (Case 2) does not occur and all the equalities of (case 1) are satisfied.
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 3.1.
2
Proof. Note that
for any x ∈ V from the equality of eq. (1). Therefore, the proof of (case 1) holds for any x 0 ∈ V . Suppose that some [x 0 , x 0 ] appears in B f ∈ A 0 . Then from the equality of eq. (4), it must be that 2 Now for each j with j = s, choose one blockB j ∈ D j arbitrarily. Let
We will prove that (B, V ) is a Steiner system S(2, n, |V |) for k = 2. Proof. Note that
First suppose that some two distinct elements {x 0 , y} appear in two or more blocks of B. These blocks must belong to the same A h because {x 0 , y} determines the secret h uniquely (k = 2). However, we chose one block from A h to construct B. This is a contradiction. Then from lemma 4.5, any two distinct elements appear in exactly one block of B. Therefore, (B, V ) is a Steiner system S(2, n, |V |). 2 5 Impossibility for k ≥ 3
In this section, we show that the equality of Theorem 3.1 cannot be satisfied for 3 ≤ k < n. 
Proof. Suppose that there exists an optimum anonymous (k, n)-threshold scheme for some 3 ≤ k < n. P 1 is included in the base set (see Def.
From lemma 4.3 and lemma 4.5, there exists a B f 1 ∈ A 0 such that y appears in B f 1 and all the elements of B f 1 are distinct. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that f 1 (P n ) = y. Then we have that f 0 (P 1 ) = f 1 (P 1 ) = f 1 (P n ) = y.
f 1 (P n−1 ) = f 1 (P n ).
Next let {P 2 , · · · , P k−1 } be a base set of the participants and define Let Γ 1 = {{P 1 , P 2 , P 3 }, {P 1 , P 2 , P 4 }, {P 1 , P 2 , P 5 }, {P 3 , P 4 }, {P 3 , P 5 }, {P 4 , P 5 }} be the minimal qualified set of an access structure on the set of participants P = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 }. In this case, we can take B 1 = {P 1 } and B 2 = {P 2 }. Note that |P \ (B 1 ∪ B 2 )| = |{P 3 , P 4 , P 5 }| ≥ 2. 
